In the last two decades in Brazil, indigenous peoples have been struggling for their rights through the practice of what they call “retomada de terras” (reappropriation of lands), which consists of reoccupying ancestral lands that were invaded by farmers or other explorers. Inspired by indigenous perspectives, new social movements are struggling for land and territory. After years of reclaiming the legal demarcation of indigenous lands or agrarian reform without a resolution from the State, they decided to act directly in the (...) building of their territories. Within this process, there is also a production of another space, another ecology, another relationship to the land. If Carl Schmitt is right when he says that the original movement that makes law arise is the taking of land, which produces an ordering of space and defines borders that establish internal and external relations, what happens when lands are retaken and borders are reshaped? If we conceive of law in a very modern and technical conception, solely linked to an institutional image, it cannot help us to answer this question. The practice of “retomada” by the Tupinambá people and the agroecological experience of the Web of the People (Teia dos Povos) in Brazil can be an interesting path to investigate how the conditions of existence can be produced beyond abstract rights and more-than-human arrangements can change the way we live together. These practices produce justice spatially in a given territory and bring conceptions of rights rooted in the entanglements of bodies and their territories. (shrink)

According to an influential view, asserting a proposition involves undertaking some “commitment” to the truth of that proposition. But accounts of what it is for someone to be committed to the truth of a proposition are often vague or imprecise, and are rarely put to work to define assertion. This article aims to fill this gap. It offers a precise characterisation of assertoric commitment, and applies it to define assertion. On the proposed view, acquiring commitment is not sufficient for asserting: (...) To assert, commitment must be acquired by explicitly presenting a proposition as true. (shrink)

Selections from the writings of Ernest Renan, a leading French writer and thinker of the 19th century.

Groups, like individuals, can communicate. They can issue statements, make promises, give advice. Sometimes, in doing so, they lie and deceive. The goal of this paper is to offer a precise characterisation of what it means for a group to make an assertion and to lie. I begin by showing that Lackey’s influential account of group assertion is unable to distinguish assertions from other speech acts, explicit statements from implicatures, and lying from misleading. I propose an alternative view, according to (...) which a group asserts a proposition only if it explicitly presents that proposition as true, thereby committing to its truth. This proposal is then put to work to define group lying. While scholars typically assume that group lying requires (i) a deceptive intent and (ii) a belief in the falsity of the asserted proposition, I offer a definition that drops condition (i) and significantly broadens condition (ii). (shrink)

The concept of a communal type of privacy shared by interconnected social groups has wide applications in the healthcare field, specifically in genetic testing and genetic data privacy (Pyrrho, Cam...

Arguably, a theory of assertion should be able to provide (i) a definition of assertion, and (ii) a set of conditions for an assertion to be appropriate. This paper reviews two strands of theories that have attempted to meet this challenge. Commitment-based accounts à la Peirce define assertion in terms of commitment to the truth of the proposition. Restriction-based accounts à la Williamson define assertion in terms of the conditions for its appropriate performance. After assessing the suitability of these projects (...) to meet the desiderata of a theory of assertion, I argue that a speech act theoretic account à la Searle is more suitable for this purpose: it integrates the core intuitions of both restriction-based and commitment-based accounts while avoiding their respective problems, and has the further advantage of determining how assertion fits into a more general theory of illocutionary acts. (shrink)

This paper analyses the communicative and epistemic value of retweeting (and more generally of reposting content on social media). Against a naïve view, it argues that retweets are not acts of endorsement, motivating this diagnosis with linguistic data. Retweeting is instead modelled as a peculiar form of quotation, in which the reported content is indicated rather than reproduced. A relevance-theoretic account of the communicative import of retweeting is then developed, to spell out the complex mechanisms by which retweets achieve their (...) communicative goals. The last section outlines the epistemic threats posed by the increasing prevalence of retweeting on social media, linking them to the low reputational, cognitive and practical costs linked to this emerging form of communication. (shrink)

This paper demonstrates that the progressive interpretation in Ga is an effect of the interaction between the imperfective aspect and a definite description of events. Crucially, the data from Ga point to the consequences of the view that definite descriptions of events encode the familiarity of the discourse referent and its uniqueness in bearing the property in question. Namely, they yield direct evidentiality and the necessary ongoingness of the event at the topic time. Thus, the paper identifies previously unattested variation (...) in the semantics of the progressive in a cross-linguistic perspective and shows that not only lexical but also grammatical aspect exhibits striking parallelisms with the nominal domain. (shrink)

A new definition of lying is gaining traction, according to which you lie only if you say what you know to be false. Drawing inspiration from “New Evil Demon” scenarios, I present a battery of counterexamples against this “Knowledge Account” of lying. Along the way, I comment upon the methodology of conceptual analysis, the moral implications of the Knowledge Account, and its ties with knowledge-first epistemology.

Is truth the rule or the aim of assertion? Philosophers disagree. After reviewing the available evidence, the hypothesis that truth is the aim of assertion is defended against recent attempts to prove that truth is rather a rule of assertion.

There is a fundamental disagreement about which norm regulates assertion. Proponents of factive accounts argue that only true propositions are assertable, whereas proponents of non-factive accounts insist that at least some false propositions are. Puzzlingly, both views are supported by equally plausible (but apparently incompatible) linguistic data. This paper delineates an alternative solution: to understand truth as the aim of assertion, and pair this view with a non-factive rule. The resulting account is able to explain all the relevant linguistic data, (...) and finds independent support from general considerations about the differences between rules and aims. (shrink)

In a recent article, Krauss (2017) raises some fundamental questions concerning (i) what the desiderata of a definition of lying are, and (ii) how definitions of lying can account for partial beliefs. This paper aims to provide an adequate answer to both questions. Regarding (i), it shows that there can be a tension between two desiderata for a definition of lying: 'descriptive accuracy' (meeting intuitions about our ordinary concept of lying), and 'moral import' (meeting intuitions about what is wrong with (...) lying), vindicating the primacy of the former desideratum. Regarding (ii), it shows that Krauss' proposed 'worse-off requirement' meets neither of these desiderata, whereas the 'comparative insincerity condition' (Marsili 2014) can meet both. The conclusion is that lies are assertions that the speaker takes to be more likely to be false than true, and their distinctive blameworthiness is a function of the extent to which they violate a sincerity norm. (shrink)

In the philosophical debate on lying, there has generally been agreement that either the speaker believes that his statement is false, or he believes that his statement is true. This article challenges this assumption, and argues that lying is a scalar phenomenon that allows for a number of intermediate cases – the most obvious being cases of uncertainty. The first section shows that lying can involve beliefs about graded truth values (fuzzy lies) and graded beliefs (graded-belief lies). It puts forward (...) a new definition to deal with these scalar parameters, that requires that the speaker asserts what he believes more likely to be false than true. The second section shows that statements are scalar in the same way beliefs are, and accounts for a further element of scalarity, illocutionary force. (shrink)

According to an influential hypothesis, the speech act of assertion is subject to a single 'constitutive' rule, that takes the form: "One must: assert that p only if p has C". Scholars working on assertion interpret the assumption that this rule is 'constitutive' in different ways. This disagreement, often unacknowledged, threatens the foundations of the philosophical debate on assertion. This paper reviews different interpretations of the claim that assertion is governed by a constitutive rule. It argues that once we understand (...) the full import of assuming that assertion is governed by a constitutive rule, it becomes clear that some fundamental assumptions of the current debate are mistaken, and others unwarranted. (shrink)

All’interno del dibattito sulla definizione filosofica della menzogna, alcuni autori hanno sostenuto che mentire è sempre sbagliato. Margolis, in particolare, ha espresso la tesi radicale secondo cui “mentire è moralmente sbagliato” è una tautologia. Nella prima parte dell’articolo introduco la tesi di Margolis, e ne difendo la plausibilità contro le semplificazioni che ha subito all’interno del dibattito filosofico, mostrando che l’applicazione condizionale del predicato “sbagliato” consente di trattare in modo adeguato alcune menzogne intuitivamente giustificabili. Nella seconda parte argomento che, nonostante (...) questo stratagemma, non è possibile difendere la tesi che “mentire è moralmente sbagliato” sia una tautologia, perché bisognerebbe assumere che “mentire è moralmente sbagliato” sia una condizione necessaria fra quelle che definiscono il concetto stesso di menzogna. Questo non è desiderabile perché, come dimostro nella parte finale del mio articolo, ogni definizione di menzogna che incorpori requisiti morali nelle sue condizioni necessarie é destinata a contraddire le intuizioni del senso comune su che cos’é una menzogna. La conclusione è che la tesi che “mentire è moralmente è sbagliato” è una tautologia non può essere difesa, se non al prezzo, troppo alto, di ridefinire in modo controintuitivo il significato del termine “menzogna”. (shrink)

Este texto trata de apresentar a posição intelectual de Fernando Do Ó, militar, advogado e espírita que atuou em Santa Maria nas décadas de 1930 a 1960, sobre espiritismo. Essas discussões foram sustentadas na análise do Pierre Bourdieu sobre as disputas percebidas do campo religioso. Destacamos suas posições a partir do que foi publicado no jornal Diário do Interior de 1930 a 1937, assim, propomos uma reflexão, da escrita na imprensa local no sentido de demarcar identidade espírita diante da pluralidade (...) de práticas mediúnicas. (shrink)

Heinz Kurz is recognised internationally as a leading economic theorist and a foremost historian of economic thought. This book pays tribute to his outstanding contributions on the occasion of his 65 th birthday by bringing together a unique collection of new essays by distinguished economists from around the world. Keynes, Sraffa, and the Criticism of Neoclassical Theory comprises twenty-three essays, covering themes in Keynesian economic theory, in the development of the modern classical approach to economic theory, linear production models, and (...) the critique of neoclassical theory. The essays in this book will be an invaluable source of inspiration for economists interested in economic theory and in the evolution of economic thought. They will also be of interest to postgraduate and research students specialising in economic theory and in the history of economic thought. (shrink)

Not every speech act can be a lie. A good definition of lying should be able to draw the right distinctions between speech acts that can be lies and speech acts that under no circumstances are lies. This paper shows that no extant account of lying is able to draw the required distinctions. It argues that a definition of lying based on the notion of ‘assertoric commitment’ can succeed where other accounts have failed. Assertoric commitment is analysed in terms of (...) two normative components: ‘accountability’ and ‘discursive responsibility’. The resulting definition of lying draws all the desired distinctions, providing an intensionally adequate analysis of the concept of lying. (shrink)

Can fictions make genuine assertions about the actual world? Proponents of the ‘Assertion View’ answer the question affirmatively: they hold that authors can assert, by means of explicit statements that are part of the work of fiction, that something is actually the case in the real world. The ‘Nonassertion’ View firmly denies this possibility. In this paper, I defend a nuanced version of the Nonassertion View. I argue that even if fictions cannot assert, they can indirectly communicate that what is (...) recounted as fictional is actually true. I show that this view is supported by independent linguistic data, and that it is able to defuse the objections that are typically raised against the Nonassertion View. I conclude by showing that this position has some interesting implications for testimonial cognitivism about fiction. (shrink)

What is lying? This entry provides a general overview of scholarly attempts to define lying in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. First, it addresses the distinction between lying and misleading, considering whether only explicit statements can be lies. The second topic is insincerity, and how it can vary in degrees under conditions of uncertainty. Its final part discusses whether lying requires an intent to deceive and genuine assertoric force.

Assertions are our standard communicative tool for sharing and acquiring information. Recent empirical studies seemingly provide converging evidence that assertions are subject to a factive norm: you are entitled to assert a proposition p only if p is true. All these studies, however, assume that we can treat participants' judgments about what an agent 'should say' as evidence of their intuitions about assertability. This paper argues that this assumption is incorrect, so that the conclusions drawn in these studies are unwarranted. (...) It shows that most people do not interpret statements about what an agent 'should say' as statements about assertability, but rather as statements about what is in the agent's interest to do. It identifies some effective measures to force the intended reading of statements about what an agent 'should say', and shows that when these measures are implemented, people's judgments consistently and overwhelmingly align with non-factive accounts of assertion. (shrink)

In a series of articles (Pagin, 2004, 2009), Peter Pagin has argued that assertion is not a social speech act, introducing a method (which we baptize ‘the P-test’) designed to refute any account that defines assertion in terms of its social effects. This paper contends that Pagin's method fails to rebut the thesis that assertion is social. We show that the P-test is both unreliable (because it overgenerates counterexamples) and counterproductive (because it ultimately provides evidence in favor of some social (...) accounts). Nonetheless, we contend that assertion is not fully social. We defend an intermediate view according to which assertion is only a partly social speech act: assertions both commit the speaker to a proposition (a social component) and present their propositional content as true (a non-social component). The upshot is that assertion is in some important respect social, although it cannot be defined solely in terms of its social effects. (shrink)

How can we capture the intuitive distinction between lying and misleading? According to a traditional view, the difference boils down to whether the speaker is saying (as opposed to implying) something that they believe to be false. This view is subject to known objections; to overcome them, an alternative view has emerged. For the alternative view, what matters is whether the speaker can consistently deny that they are committed to knowing the relevant proposition. We point out serious flaws for this (...) alternative view, and sketch a simpler alternative that incorporates key insights of the traditional view. (shrink)

Secondo la definizione “standard”, la menzogna è definita da quattro condizioni necessarie, congiuntamente sufficienti. La prima (condizione dell’asserto) richiede che il parlante proferisca un asserto in una frase dichiarativa dotata di senso compiuto. La seconda (condizione dell’insincerità), stabilisce che il parlante debba credere falso il contenuto proposizionale (p) del suo asserto, e la terza (condizione dell’interlocutore) richiede che l’asserto sia rivolto a un interlocutore. Secondo l’ultima condizione (condizione dell’intenzione di ingannare), il parlante deve avere l’intenzione di far credere all’interlocutore che (...) p è vero. Nei primi 5 capitoli di questa tesi discuto pregi e difetti di ognuna di queste condizioni. Nell’ultimo capitolo propongo una lettura pragmatica della menzogna, intesa come asserzione insincera, toccando questioni legate alla teoria degli atti linguistici e delle implicature conversazionali. (shrink)

In a recent book (_Lying and insincerity_, Oxford University Press, 2018), Andreas Stokke argues that one lies iff one says something one believes to be false, thereby proposing that it becomes common ground. This paper shows that Stokke’s proposal is unable to draw the right distinctions about insincere performative utterances. The objection also has repercussions on theories of assertion, because it poses a novel challenge to any attempt to define assertion as a proposal to update the common ground.

This paper is divided into two parts. In the first part, I extend the traditional definition of lying to illocutionary acts executed by means of explicit performatives, focusing on promising. This is achieved in two steps. First, I discuss how the utterance of a sentence containing an explicit performative such as “I promise that Φ ” can count as an assertion of its content Φ . Second, I develop a general account of insincerity meant to explain under which conditions a (...) given illocutionary act can be insincere, and show how this applies to promises. I conclude that a promise to Φ is insincere (and consequently a lie) only if the speaker intends not to Φ , or believes that he will not Φ , or both. In the second part, I test the proposed definition of lying by promising against the intuitions of ordinary language speakers. The results show that, unlike alternative accounts, the proposed definition makes the correct predictions in the cases tested. Furthermore, these results challenge the following necessary conditions for telling a lie with content p: that you have to assert p directly; that you have to believe that p be false; that p must be false; that you must aim to deceive the addressee into believing that p. (shrink)

In the philosophical literature on the definition of lying, the analysis is generally restricted to cases of flat-out belief. This chapter considers the complex phenomenon of lies involving partial beliefs – beliefs ranging from mere uncertainty to absolute certainty. The first section analyses lies uttered while holding a graded belief in the falsity of the assertion, and presents a revised insincerity condition, requiring that the liar believes the assertion to be more likely to be false than true. The second section (...) analyses assertions that express graded beliefs, exploring how mitigation and reinforcement can alter the insincerity conditions for lying. The last section considers the case of lies that attack certainty (knowledge-lies), understood as attempt to alter the hearer's graded beliefs. (shrink)

Speech acts are governed by a variety of illocutionary norms. Building on Sbisà’s (2019) work, this chapter attempts to develop a common framework to study them. Four families of illocutionary rules are identified: (i) Validity rules set conditions for (actual) performance; (ii) Cooperative rules set conditions for cooperative performance; (iii) Illocutionary goals set conditions for successful performance; (iv) Illocutionary obligations set conditions for compliance. Illocutionary rules are often taken to play a constitutive role: speech acts are said to be constituted (...) by the unique set of rules that regulates them. Against this view, it is argued that many illocutionary rules are instead best construed as rationally derivable expectations of cooperation. This alternative paradigm provides fertile ground to reconcile scholarly disagreement between speech act theorists, and yields a promising explanation of how illocutionary norms are learned and evolve through time. (shrink)

Os Discursos à Nação Alemã de Fichte foram considerados durante muito tempo uma importante contribuição para o desenvolvimento do nacionalismo alemão e do pensamento nacionalista em geral Todavia, embora os Discursos continuem sendo lidos como um prenúncio das aspirações nacionalistas alemãs, grande parte de seu contendo substantivo é hoje ignorado. Neste artigo, o Autor examina um aspecto deveras negligenciado dos Discursos, a saber, o “sistema de educação nacional” neles propostos e que merecem séria consideração pelo modo como Fichte concebe e (...) articula o papel e função da intelligentsia em busca de salvação nacional. Argumenta-se, de modo especial, que é através da exaltação da educação que Fichte legitima sua proposta de governo por uma elite erudita, um tipo de despotismo esclareci do. Mostra-se ainda que o escopo dos privilégios concedidos aos “eruditos” na reforma educacional de Fichte solapa seu potencial radicalmente igualitarista, e que sua proposta termina por mostrar-se incoerente e inconsistente em seus próprios termos, na medida em que os propósitos explícitos de seu sistema e os resultados prometidos invalidariam completamente, se levados a cabo, a reivindicação dos esclarecidos de governa, se não a necessidade de tais governantes. (shrink)

RESUMO Este artigo apresenta e discute acontecimentos que emergiram no decorrer de uma pesquisa-intervenção com jovens, visando problematizar as contribuições para a formação ética, estética e política tanto dos pesquisadores como dos participantes. Oficinas estéticas mediadas por linguagens artístico-visuais consistiram no modus operandi da pesquisa-intervenção, sendo os acontecimentos relativos à oficina de graffiti o foco das análises aqui apresentadas. Participaram dessa oficina entre 20 a 25 jovens matriculados em uma escola pública municipal de Florianópolis/SC, com idades entre 13 e 16 (...) anos. As atividades foram coordenadas por bolsistas de IC e extensão, graduandos de psicologia, e um bolsista AT, grafiteiro. Os registros das atividades foram feitos via filmagens, fotografia e registros em diário de campo. As análises foram realizadas a partir de uma perspectiva dialógica, com foco na responsividade que conota as ações e pauta a condição alteritária da existência.ABSTRACT This paper presents and discusses events that emerged in the course of research involving an intervention conducted with youngsters. The objective was to discuss contributions to ethical, aesthetic and political formation of both the researchers and participants. Aesthetic workshops mediated by artistic-visual languages consisted of the modus operandi of the intervention research, and the events related to a graffiti workshop were the focus of this analysis. From 20 to 25 youngsters, aged between 13 to 16 years old and enrolled in a city public school in Florianópolis, SC, Brazil participated. The activities were coordinated by undergraduate research assistants, senior psychology students, and one graffiti artist who received a Technical Support scholarship. The activities were filmed, photographed and recorded in a field diary. The analyses were conducted from a dialogic perspective focusing on responsiveness that connotes the actions and grounds the otherness nature of existence. (shrink)

Este artigo intenciona compreender a dimensão discursiva das pinturas por meio da análise do discurso ancorada em Michel Foucault. Recorta-se a figura do espelho em pinturas canônicas com vistas a observar seu funcionamento discursivo enquanto elemento do enunciado artístico visual. Apresenta três partes: a primeira, que determina o lugar ocupado pelo discurso estético nos trabalhos de Michel Pêcheux e de Michel Foucault; a segunda, que se concentra na análise de três pinturas europeias, a saber, As meninas, de Velásquez; Um bar (...) em Folies-Bergère, de Manet; e As ligações perigosas, de Magritte; e a terceira parte, que discute a intersecção entre visualidade e interdiscursividade a partir (a) das reflexões de M. Foucault acerca do discurso estético e (b) da figura do espelho presente nessas pinturas. (shrink)

Fundamentos da bioética -- Situações emergentes em bioética -- Situações persistentes em bioética.

I argue that work in medical ethics which attempts to humanize medicine without examining hidden assumptions (about medicine's ontology, explanations, goals, relationships) has the dehumanizing effect of legitimating practices which treat persons as abstractions. After illustrating the need to reexamine the field of medical ethics and the doctor-patient relationship in particular, I use Foucault's work to provide a social, historical framework for discussion. This background begins to demonstrate that doctor-patient relationships cannot be made satisfactory by new hospital policies or interpersonal (...) skills, but have deep-rooted problems due to medicine's place in social history. Real progress requires social or structural change. (shrink)

This study focuses on retraction notices from two major Latin American/Caribbean indexing databases: SciELO and LILACS. SciELO includes open scientific journals published mostly in Latin America/the Caribbean, from which 10 % are also indexed by Thomson Reuters Web of Knowledge Journal of Citation Reports. LILACS has a similar geographical coverage and includes dissertations and conference/symposia proceedings, but it is limited to publications in the health sciences. A search for retraction notices was performed in these two databases using the keywords “retracted”, (...) “retraction” “withdrawal”, “withdrawn”, “removed” and “redress”. Documents were manually checked to identify those that actually referred to retractions, which were then analyzed and categorized according to the reasons alleged in the notices. Dates of publication/retraction and time to retraction were also recorded. Searching procedures were performed between June and December 2014. Thirty-one retraction notices were identified, fifteen of which were in JCR-indexed journals. “Plagiarism” was alleged in six retractions of this group. Among the non-JCR journals, retraction reasons were alleged in fourteen cases, twelve of which were attributed to “plagiarism”. The proportion of retracted articles for the SciELO database was approximately 0.005 %. The reasons alleged in retraction notices may be used as signposts to inform discussions in Latin America on plagiarism and research integrity. At the international level, these results suggest that the correction of the literature is becoming global and is not limited to mainstream international publications. (shrink)

There is a fundamental disagreement about which norm regulates assertion. Proponents of factive accounts argue that only true propositions are assertable, whereas proponents of non-factive accounts insist that at least some false propositions are. This paper delineates an alternative solution: to understand truth as the aim of assertion. In asserting, you describe reality as being in a certain way, and you succeed only if reality is indeed in that way. This tells us under which conditions assertions are successful, but not (...) yet under which condition they are permissible. The second half of the paper explores the possibility of deriving assertability constraints from the view that truth is the aim of assertion, appealing to some general principles of cooperation. The assertability expectations predicted by this account are loose and sensitive to features of the context. I conclude by highlighting some important reasons to prefer this view over alternative accounts. (shrink)

Can fictions lie? According to a classic conception, works of fiction can never contain lies, since their content is not presented as true, nor is it meant to deceive us. But this classic view can be challenged. Sometimes fictions appear to make claims about the actual world, and these claims can be designed to convey falsehoods, historical misconceptions, and even pernicious stereotypes. Should we conclude that some fictional statements are lies? This article introduces two views that support a positive answer, (...) and two that support a negative one. After examining various ways in which fictions can deceive, it concludes in favour of the view that fictional statements can mislead, but never lie. (shrink)

Many political theorists believe that a state cannot be neutral when it comes to languages. Legislatures cannot avoid picking a language in which to conduct their business and teachers have to teach their pupils in a language. However, against that, some political liberals argue that liberal neutrality is consistent with the state endorsement of particular languages. Claims to the contrary, they say, are based on a misguided understanding of what neutrality is. I will argue that this line of argument fails, (...) for two reasons. First, the primary challenge to which political liberals should respond is not that of reconciling the promotion of languages with liberal neutrality but, rather, that of reconciling liberal neutrality with the fact that reasonable people disagree about the existence and nature of languages. Second, even if everyone accepted the existence of languages along essentialist lines, one should still doubt the possibility of state neutrality with respect to them, regardless of the conception of neutrality one prefers. The reason why is that human beings cannot care about or value languages so when a state promotes a particular language, it is not supporting the preferences of its citizens but, rather, acting on perfectionist or simply irrational grounds. (shrink)